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The unique construction of the Symposium has produced many different
approaches to its characters and their roles. There have been count-
less interpretations of Socrates, Diotima, Alcibiades and Aristophanes’s
speeches and roles in the dialogue.2 Scholars have also examined some
of the less prominent speeches and characters. For example, David Kon-
stan developed a powerful analysis of Eryximachus’s speech that demon-
strates its “intellectual rigor” and “the logic of the discourse” (Konstan,
1982: 44). Further, he shows how Eryximachus makes a legitimate move
from “medical theory to some rather grandiose propositions about the
cosmos and the gods” (Konstan, 1982: 44). However, even within these
investigations, Agathon has for the most part, simply been set to the side,
and consequently, interpretations have struggled to gain a coherent un-
derstanding of the dialogue.3 At first glance, this inclination to dismiss
Agathon cannot be faulted. He appears to be a rather uncontroversial
and a useless character. His speech, for example, seems to be merely a
1 Sam Hege is currently reading for a Master of Science at the University of Edin-
burgh. He graduated from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill with a
major in ‘Classics-Civilisation and Philosophy’, and a minor in ‘History’.
2 For examples see: Reeve (2006), Nussbaum (1979), Ludwig (2002), Neumann
(1965).
3 Sedley does give weight to the speech of Agathon, however, he does not attempt
to unify Agathon’s role with an understanding of eros or expand upon the rela-
tionship between Agathon and Socrates (2006).
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showcase of his rhetorical skill and a list of his own apparent qualities.
However, unlike many of the other symposiasts, Agathon plays a consis-
tent role in the dramatic actions throughout the dialogue. Among other
examples, he is the host of the banquet, shares a couch with Socrates
and Alcibiades, is the object of both their pursuits and is the last one to
stay up doing “philosophy” with Socrates. Most importantly, he is the
cause and focus of Socrates’s questioning and speech at the heart of the
dialogue (199c-201e). Based on these thoughts, the focus of this paper
is to help establish Agathon as a central character to the deeper philo-
sophical context of the Symposium. This interpretation will subsequently
help to refocus part of the common understanding of Platonic eros from
thoughts on individual love to educational methods.
Despite a predominant lack of interest in Agathon, a few studies
have utilised him in developing interpretations of the text. In particular,
Luc Brisson’s ‘Agathon, Pausanias, and Diotima in Plato’s Symposium:
Paiderastia and Philosohia’ demonstrates Agathon’s role in understand-
ing the dialogue as a pederastic critique. Overall, Brisson differentiates
between common pederasty and Paiderastia; the latter being a more no-
ble pursuit aimed at Philosophia, rather than mere sophistic knowledge
or sexual pleasure (Brisson, 2006: 229). He, then, claims that Paiderastia
is represented in the life long relationship between Agathon and Pausa-
nias. Specifically, Brisson interprets Pausanias’s speech as a passionate
defense of this noble form of pederasty (Brisson, 2006: 240-45). Further,
Diotima’s speech develops a critique of Paiderastia (Brisson, 2006: 240-
51).4 Overall, Brisson’s argument successfully demonstrates the need to
incorporate ideas of education, specifically Greek thoughts on the ap-
propriate ways to pursue knowledge, into our understanding of the dia-
logue. However, despite this success, we will see that Brisson ultimately
underplays Agathon’s significance to the whole dialogue.
My argument will begin by describing Agathon’s role in the drama
of the dialogue. Specifically, the first section will examine Agathon as
a historical character and what effect that has on our understanding of
Plato’s literary characterisation. Further, the section will examine how
particular parts of his biography have led previous interpretations to
dismiss Agathon’s importance in the dialogue. Finally, it will argue
for a positive and substantial reading of Plato’s Agathon that highlights
his good-nature and moral intuitions. In the second section, we will
turn to a close examination of Agathon’s speech. Overall, the speech re-
flects moral and rational inclinations, but also youth, naivety and a lack
of philosophical refinement. The third section will, then, demonstrate
that Socrates develops both his questioning and speech as a response to
4 In addition, see (Nightengale, 1993) for an alternative understanding of the Pla-
tonic critique, namely dealing with the encomiastic discourse.
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Agathon. On the one hand, Socrates exhibits a level of academic respect
for the young man. However, there also seems to be an implicit criticism
of the educational system that failed to develop Agathon’s potentials.
The fourth section will concentrate on the conclusion of the dialogue
and argue that Alcibiades comes to embody Athenian education. Fur-
ther, the focus will be on how the last few pages present a dramatic
competition between Socrates and Alcibiades veiled by sexual contact,
but actually representing two different educational paths. These pages
of the dialogue will also be used to argue for a tragic reading of Agathon
that reflects this educational interpretation. Overall, the paper is aimed
at reexamining the role of Agathon and including this new understand-
ing of his character to the many intriguing layers of the Symposium.
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We should first examine the elements of Agathon’s historical biography
in order to develop a better understanding of his characterisation in the
dialogue. At the Symposium’s dramatic date, Agathon is around thirty
years old (Nails, 2002: 8). At this stage, Greek elite were expected to
be married or, at least, no longer the eromenos of a pederastic relation-
ship (Brisson, 2006: 233-4). However, Agathon was well-known for hav-
ing been the lifelong beloved to Pausanias. In fact, this is how Plato
introduces both of them in the Protagoras (315e). In the comedy Thes-
mophoriazusae, a play produced five years after the dramatic date of the
Symposium, Aristophanes criticises Agathon for being effeminate and
passive (29, 182-5, 217f, 247-50). In a recent interpretation, Peter H. von
Blanckenhagen claims that, “In modern slang, Agathon is a drag queen”
(1992: 59). Based on this evidence, it seems that Agathon’s relationship
was both visible to the public and open to some level of criticism. In ad-
dition to his reputation for being the constant beloved, Agathon was a
successful tragedian. As Plato highlights, the whole reason for this sym-
posium and Socrates’s attendance is to celebrate Agathon’s first victory
in the Dionysia festival (174a). Also, Aristotle credits him with being
one of the first tragedians to have developed his own plot: not based on
received mythological figures (Poet. 1451b, 1454b, 1456a). In 407 BC, he
was invited to live at the court of Archelaus, a Macedonian king, presum-
ably under his patronage.5 Although of a limited nature, these examples
of Agathon’s prolific playwriting career suggest a more complex picture
5 Pausanias was reported to have accompanied him. In addition, this is mentioned
both in the Symposium (172c) and in Aristophanes’s Frogs.
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than Aristophanes presents. Therefore, we should examine what aspects
of Agathon’s historical background are highlighted in Plato’s depiction.
Turning to the Symposium, Plato seems to develop a character that
reflects the multiple historic dimensions of Agathon. Throughout the
dialogue, Agathon is consistently referred to as the youth of the group,
despite the fact that he is a fully matured man (223A). Furthermore, in
the Protagoras, Agathon is mentioned for his youth and good looks, as
well as, his relationship to Pausanias (315d-e). Therefore, Brisson rightly
emphasises that Agathon assumes the role of the beloved among the
symposiasts. The following passage clearly highlights how Agathon, de-
spite his age, was still functioning in a pederastic mindset, “Socrates,
come lie down next to me. Who knows, if I touch you, I may catch a
bit of the wisdom that came to you under my neighbor’s porch. It’s
clear you’ve seen the light. If you hadn’t, you’d still be standing there”
(175D). As Brisson argues, this passage “associates the transmission of
knowledge from one man to another to that of a seminal fluid” (Brisson,
2006: 229). More specifically, Brisson demonstrates how he is part of
the noblest or highest form of male-male relationships, in that his and
Pausanias’s pursuits are aimed, first and foremost, at Philosophia. For
Brisson argues that Agathon’s main purpose in the dialogue is his con-
nection to Pausanias, and together, they subsequently develop a defense
of Paiderastia. However, this is also where Brisson’s essay demonstrates
its limited perceptions of Agathon’s character.
In analysing Plato’s characterisation of Agathon, we should also no-
tice how Plato emphasises Agathon’s intellectual and moral intuitions
completely independent of his relationship with Pausanias. Returning
to the Protagoras, Plato describes Agathon as the young and attractive
boy that shares a couch with his lover Pausanias. Yet, in the Symposium,
from the moment Agathon enters the scene, he demonstrates a certain
moral intuition that is not at all connected to Pausanias. For example,
when Aristodemus shows up uninvited, Agathon graciously welcomes
him and even provides an excuse for why he did not invite him in the
first place (174e). As the host, Agathon also demonstrates a serious intel-
lectual interest, as is evident in his choice to invite certain symposiasts.
Mainly from the upper echelons of Athens, the group includes members
of the aristocracy (Phaedrus and Eryximachus), and the intellectual elite
(Aristophanes and Socrates) (Von Blanckenhagen, 1992: 60). Overall,
this suggests that Plato clearly sought to portray Agathon in a positive
light. Agathon is interested in intellectual pursuits and demonstrates a
willingness to develop such attempts.
In addition to this positive characterisation, Plato develops an impor-
tant relationship between Agathon and Socrates. First, they manage to
share a couch with each other, despite the latter’s late arrival. If the em-
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phasis was on Agathon the beloved, as Brisson argues, why does he not
share a couch with Pausanias, as he did in the Protagoras? This decision
was certainly not an accident. It seems clear that Agathon specifically
held the seat next to him for Socrates. In the passage quoted above
(175d), Agathon reveals the reasons behind this desire, namely a pur-
suit of Socrates’s wisdom. On the one hand, this statement reflects a
pederastic background, by associating knowledge with physical contact.
However, the decision also reflects a larger interest in the pursuit of
knowledge. Pausanias does not seem to be offended by Agathon’s de-
cision, suggesting that Agathon’s intentions are noble and intellectually
driven. The statement should also be compared to that of Alcibiades’s,
later in the dialogue (218e-219a). This connection demonstrates how
they both share an interest in gaining knowledge from Socrates, as well
as the pederastic model they utilised for acquiring such wisdom. In
addition, Socrates responds to both in a rather ironic way. On the one
hand, Socrates claims his wisdom is but “a shadow in a dream” com-
pared to Agathon’s own wisdom (175e). On the other hand, Socrates
claims that Alcibiades is trying to exchange a bronze standard of wis-
dom, “the merest appearance of beauty”, for a gold standard, “the thing
itself” (218e). However, it seems that Agathon understands Socrates’s
sarcasm and even responds with some of his own, “Now you’ve gone
too far, Socrates” (175e). This playfulness suggests a certain level of re-
spect between Agathon and Socrates that, as we will see, is emphasised
throughout the dialogue.
This relationship between Socrates and Agathon also seems to struc-
ture some of the main philosophical and dramatic developments of the
dialogue. Firstly, Agathon’s speech is the only one to be given a more
traditional Socratic refutation. Further, Socrates structures his entire de-
piction of Diotima’s advice in relation to this interaction with Agathon,
“I think it will be easiest for me to proceed the way Diotima did and
tell you how she questioned me. You see, I had told her almost the
same things Agathon told me just now” (201E). While this statement
will be examined in detail later for its philosophical importance, on a ba-
sic level, it deepens the importance of the connection between these two
characters. In the final scene of the dialogue, Plato depicts a comedic
display that once again emphasises this connection between Socrates
and Agathon, “As if the real point of all this has not been simply to
make trouble between Agathon and me!” (222D). Finally, of all the other
characters, Agathon stays awake the longest doing “philosophy” with
Socrates. Therefore, based on this evidence, it appears that Plato pur-
posefully structured major pieces of the dialogue around their relation-
ship.
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Overall, the combination of Agathon’s central role in the dialogue
and his moral intuitions suggest some preliminary conclusions. Firstly,
Agathon attempts to foster an environment focused on attaining wis-
dom, and he is particularly interested in what Socrates has to say. Fur-
ther, it seems that by highlighting the relationship between Agathon and
Socrates, we can begin to see some of the educational components to the
dialogue. Therefore, we should try to comprehend how the connection
between them affects the Symposium’s philosophical program. Also, we
should see what this interpretation of Agathon adds to the dialogue’s
conception of eros. Nevertheless, it seems that based simply on this
examination of his character and relationships, Agathon has merited a
closer analysis.
￿ . ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ’￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
In this section, we will examine how Agathon’s speech helps develop
the philosophical progress of the Symposium. For the most part, mod-
ern interpretation has dismissed his speech as simple and self-absorbed.
Brisson describes the speech as “empty but magnificently constructed”
(Brisson, 2006: 245). He argues that it is a showcase of his training
in Gorgianic rhetoric and ability to use poetic citations, rather than a
speech aimed at real intellectual pursuits. This criticism is furthered by
Nehamas and Woodruff in their translation of the dialogue. They sug-
gest that the speech really only reflects Agathon’s connection to the god
Eros, his youth, and physical beauty. For example, after he concludes
his speech “everyone there burst into applause, so becoming to himself
and to the god did they think the young man’s speech” (198a). Here,
Nehamas and Woodruff suggest that the ‘to himself’, “refers to him as
the youngest and best-looking man present” (Nehamas et la, 1989: 37).
Overall, interpreters seem to disregard Agathon’s speech on account of
his claim that Eros is happy, young, beautiful and delicate, (the reflec-
tion of the beloved). This sort of focus on individual beauty suggests
that Agathon’s speech is a digression from the intellectual atmosphere
of the Symposium (Brisson, 2006: 245).6 Thus, it does not seem to merit
any further analysis.
However, despite these valid criticisms, it does seem that Agathon’s
speech reflects the same moral intuitions and intellectual potential that
were established in the previous section. Firstly, we should draw our
attention to comments Agathon makes just before he begins his speech:
“Why, Socrates, you must think I have nothing but theater audiences on
6 This is also present in Von Blanckenhagen (1992: 62).
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my mind! So you suppose I don’t realise that, if you’re intelligent, you
find a few sensible men much more frightening than a senseless crowd”
(194B). This reflects a common Socratic argument where “wisdom is the
only really good thing and ignorance (lack of wisdom) the only really
bad one. Because the majority are unwise, they cannot reliably pro-
duce the effects they want” (Reeve, 2002: 64). Specifically, the statement
echoes the Crito, “But, my dear Crito, why do we care so much for what
most people think? For the most reasonable men, whose opinion is more
worth considering, will think that things were done as they really will
be done” (44c-d). Although Agathon’s statement does not directly refer
to this Socratic idea, it does indicate that he, at the least, has an appreci-
ation and respect for knowledge over mere approval of the masses. This
example will help to establish a trend within Agathon’s speech, namely
that while Agathon has the right initial tendencies, his philosophical
background is clearly at a novice level.
At the start of his speech, Agathon continues to develop a very “So-
cratic” approach to his praise of Eros, “what he is like (referring to Eros),
no one has spoken about that” (195A). Further, he says, “Now, only one
method is correct for every praise, no matter whose: you must explain
what qualities in the subject of your speech enable him to give the bene-
fits for which we praise him” (195A). Here Agathon establishes a philo-
sophical methodology for his speech. On the one hand, this scheme
for praising eros seems to refer back to some of the earlier Platonic di-
alogues, where Socrates is pursuing his famous definitions of piety or
other virtues and trying to understand the what-it-is (ti esti). In fact,
Agathon uses very similar language to the earlier Socratic dialogues.
Further, Socrates then approves of this method later in the Symposium,
even using the same hoios language multiple times, “Indeed, Agathon, I
thought you led the way beautifully into your speech when you said that
one should first show the qualities of Love himself, and only then those
of his deeds. I must admire that beginning. Come, then, since you have
beautifully and magnificently expounded his qualities in other ways
[. . . ]” (199c). This indicates that Agathon develops a correct method
for understanding eros in his speech. However, since his philosophical
training is not fully developed, he does not use the ti estin terminology.
On the other hand, this approach also seems to differentiate his speech
from the speeches before his; Agathon is interested in the what-it-is,
whereas the other speeches are interested in the benefits of Love for hu-
mans. For example, Aristophanes thinks that love should be praised for
drawing people together (192e). In addition, this method seems to sep-
arate Agathon from some of Socrates’s other interlocutors throughout
Plato’s works. For example, in Meno, Socrates asks Meno what virtue
is (71d). However, Meno responds by listing a number of instances of
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virtue, “There is virtue for every action and every age, for every task
of ours and every one of us” (72a). In this example, we should notice
that Socrates is using the more technical ti esti language. Nevertheless,
it seems Agathon should be acknowledged for correctly establishing the
task for Socrates’s more in-depth and advanced philosophical discus-
sion.
In addition to proposing a proper philosophical method, Agathon
also develops a legitimate explanation of eros that focuses on its moral
qualities. He claims that Eros is the most beautiful and the best of the
gods. However, the god is not just young and beautiful, but also just,
courageous, temperate and wise (196d). Overall, he sets up a picture of
eros in its ideal state. In doing this, the speech has also produced the
criticism’s that were discussed earlier. Yet, Agathon also proposes that
when loving, one is inspired towards the good and becomes happy and
peaceful. For example, after Apollo was touched by eros, he “invented
archery, medicine, and prophecy” (197a). In contrast, those who are not
guided by eros end in oblivion (197a). This perspective on eros does seem
to be rather naive and hopeful, but it does not seem to be mere fluff or
self-absorbed.
However, in developing this naive perspective on eros, Agathon also
demonstrates his lack of philosophical understanding. He suggests that
when eros is involved the person is always directed to do good things,
“That too is how the gods’ quarrels were settled, once Love came to be
among them; love of beauty, obviously, because love is not drawn to ug-
liness [. . . ] But once this god was born, all goods came to gods and men
alike through love of beauty” (197b-c). This picture is somewhat accu-
rate, but only insofar as the love is directed to the good. It seems we
could think of eros directing one’s passions at bad goals. Perhaps a sim-
ple example is the case of Alcibiades and how his passions resulted in
the virtual destruction of the Athenian empire (Wohl, 2002). The main
problem with Agathon’s speech is that it fails to appropriately define
and defend eros in its entirety. Overall, his speech leaves open many
unanswered questions that Agathon fails to recognise. Frisbee Sheffield
well illustrates some of these questions in Plato’s Symposium: Ethics of
Desire. For example, how and why does eros engender the creation of or
the possession of good and beautiful things? His answer is that since it
is all of those good and beautiful things, its presence in other beings pro-
motes those tendencies (196e). However, this runs into conflict with his
notion that it is creative. If one already has these qualities within them,
why should they bother with these pursuits at all? (Sheffield, 2006: 25).
While there seems to be an easy solution to this question, namely that
someone would want to create more of it, Agathon fails to account for
this possibility. In addition, when Socrates refutes him on this topic, he
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fails to utilise this answer in his defense. Overall, these criticisms seem
to highlight both his naive goodness and a highly unrefined philosophi-
cal education.
Following these examples, it seems we can draw some preliminary
conclusions regarding Agathon’s larger role in the dialogue. On the one
hand, Brisson suggests that “his speech echoes that of Pausanias, which
is intended as a defense and illustration of paiderastia as an educative
instrument that enables the achievement of excellence in all its forms,
particularly in the area of poetry his Eros possesses all the virtues and
can transmit them to everyone” (Brisson, 2006: 246). In fact, Agathon’s
speech does demonstrate an impressive use of meter, poetic citations and
understanding of Gorgian style rhetoric.7 However, Agathon’s speech
also reflects true philosophical progress on a number of important lev-
els. These intellectual features of his speech and his overall set of moral
intuitions suggest that Agathon represents more than just the product
of his relationship with Pausanias. Further, in the next section of the
dialogue, Socrates picks up on this philosophical progress both in his
refutation of Agathon and in Diotima’s speech. Therefore, an important
question arises: how can we make sense of Agathon’s speech within the
larger context of the dialogue? It seems that his role is two-fold. On
the one hand, Agathon does express a certain goodness that is reflected
throughout the dialogue. However, on the other hand, these qualities
are corrupted by his education. Throughout the speech, Agathon is con-
sistently disrupted by his need to include references to poetry or utilise
his rhetorical training, “I am suddenly struck by a need to say some-
thing in poetic meter” (197c). Further, we can see this complex role
expressed within Socrates’s refutation and Diotima’s speech. Socrates
demonstrates a level of respect towards Agathon, but there is also a se-
rious criticism of him, as the product of Athenian education. Therefore,
within this criticism, we can now see that even the “fluff” of Agathon’s
speech serves a larger purpose in the dialogue’s philosophical develop-
ment, namely a critique of Agathon’s educational upbringing.
￿ . ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ , ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
In the following section, we will see how Agathon’s philosophical role
helps develop the content of the more debated sections of the dialogue.
To start, despite the large number of speeches presented before Socrates’s
turn, the philosopher decides to focus his response around and towards
7 Roberts provides a full discussion of the influence of Gorgias on Agathon’s
rhetoric. 1900.
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Agathon. As we have seen, Socrates approves of Agathon’s method-
ological approach (199c). Then, he “corrects” one of the major flaws of
Agathon’s argument by demonstrating Agathon’s inability to defend his
definition of eros against dialectic (199d-201c). However, unlike many
Platonic dialogues, Socrates follows this elenchus by admitting to make
the same mistakes Agathon has just made (201e).8 This can then be read
in context with his introduction of Diotima, “I shall try to go through for
you the speech about Love I once heard from a woman of Mantinea, Di-
otima [. . . ] She is the one who taught me the art of love” (201d). So that
Diotima’s speech becomes a mouthpiece for how Socrates was able to
move out of the same state of aporia that Agathon now possesses. Thus,
Plato seems to be indicating that Agathon is, at least, on the right philo-
sophical track and that we can find partial truths within his speech. Fur-
ther, this relationship between Agathon and Socrates helps express the
positive and negative educational messages of the Symposium, namely
an argument for the philosophical or examined life, and the negative
critique of current Athenian educational systems.9 Finally, if Socrates
and Diotima are to be Plato’s platforms for proposing this argument,
then Agathon, the embodiment of both youth and pederasty, as well as
intellectual desire and moral intuition, reflects the potential to lead the
right type of life and the product of a system that failed to harness that
potential.
First, in Socrates’s questioning of Agathon, we can start to understand
why Agathon is the prime candidate of focus for the instructions. We are
not surprised when the refutation is quick and easy; however, it is also
the only real “Socratic Dialogue” that we get in the Symposium, where
Socrates proves the interlocutor to be mistaken by simply showing he
believes two contradictory things about the topic. One possible inter-
pretation is that the elenchus becomes the first step towards the Socratic
concept of the examined life. The next step for the individual is to accept
his state of aporia and try to resolve it in new ways. At the end of this
section, Agathon almost seems perfectly primed to pursue this lifestyle,
“I am unable to challenge you. Let it be as you say” (201c). This indicates
that Agathon does not become defensive about this refutation, as many
of Socrates’s interlocutors. In the case of Thrasymachus, in the Repub-
lic, following his discussion with Socrates, he claims not to be satisfied
with Socrates’s account and that he could still argue his original point if
Socrates would allow him to make a speech about it (350d). In contrast,
Agathon claims to be unable to challenge Socrates. This implies that
8 Good examples are found in Euthyphro, and Gorgias.
9 I realise that I have not fully defined these general notions of Athenian education.
Nonetheless, I have in mind sophistry, pederasty, etc. Further, it seemed outside
the scope of this paper to further develop these notions.
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Agathon has no other way of arguing with Socrates. Also, Plato uses the
same verb in both Agathon’s response to Socrates’s questioning, “Let it
be as you say” (201c) and Socrates’ response to Diotima’s questioning,
“True, as you say” (202a). While this does not necessarily mean that
Socrates’s refutation is a good and accurate one, it does suggest that
Agathon is a willing participant in the dialectic and brings the argument
as far as he can.
Following the elenchus, we should notice Agathon would be in a sim-
ilar state to Alcibiades when Socrates forced him to “feel shame”, (216b)
as well as when Socrates was corrected by Diotima for making the same
mistakes (201e). Both of these comparisons will help better illustrate the
role of Agathon in this central section of the Symposium. Firstly, Agathon
seems to possess a far superior sense of the importance of wisdom than
Alcibiades. Imagine being the “star” of the night and after delivering
your speech, the person who you most respect and admire dismantles
you in front of your closest friends. Would we expect the same calm
and gracious reaction from Alcibiades? Therefore, at least in contrast to
Alcibiades, Plato seems to continue to highlight Agathon’s moral condi-
tion.
Following the questioning of Agathon, Socrates makes a crucial ad-
mission, “You see, I had told her almost the same things Agathon told
me just now: that Love is a great god and that he belongs to beautiful
things” (201e). In terms of the philosophical message, this statement
seems to setup Diotima’s speech as a response to the problems exhib-
ited in Agathon’s speech and even his character. Prior to this statement,
Socrates commends Agathon for establishing the right type of methodol-
ogy, “following your lead, Agathon, one should first describe who Love
is and what he is like, and afterwards describe his works” (201d). Both
of these statements suggest that Socrates was, at some point, in the same
academic position as Agathon is on the night of this infamous sympo-
sium. Further, based on this interpretation, Diotima’s speech becomes
a way for Plato to express how Socrates moved from this level of intel-
lectual potential to the fully actualised embodiment of the philosophical
life.
As Brisson has argued, Agathon is involved in the most ideal form
of pederasty; a relationship that is defended ardently by Pausanias ear-
lier in the dialogue. But, in addition to this role, it also seems fair to
argue that Agathon reflects a wider body of Athenian youth and their
education. Perhaps one way of understanding Agathon’s role is to think
of him embodying the qualities of a youth that might be selected for
further education in the Kallipolis of Plato’s Republic. However, since
Agathon is well-beyond the appropriate age to start the training of a
philosopher-king, it appears that Plato is emphasising that Agathon’s
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education failed to fully utilise his good nature and intellectual poten-
tials. Thus, Socrates and Diotima seem to have two tasks set before
them: criticise the current educational systems and provide a positive
alternative (e.g. the philosophical life).
The speech, however, does not provide the straightforward and di-
rect type of response that we might like. For instance, it is odd that
Plato would, in the midst of this “celebrity” event, bring in what ap-
pears to be a fictional character. Debra Nails argues that Diotima should
be treated on her own as a representation of religion and mysticism and
not conflated with philosophy (2006: 193). This sort of reading makes
sense with the rest of the characters: a doctor, comedian, tragedian, and
philosopher. In addition, we should remember that in the Symposium
Plato is trying to reach out to a non-philosophical audience. There-
fore, he must employ non-philosophical means of getting to a philo-
sophical life. In this sense, Diotima is advising for the philosophical
life inadvertently. Perhaps one understanding is that Plato is proclaim-
ing a philosophical or examined approach to the many different topics
that are present in the Symposium: medicine, tragedy, comedy, religion,
etc. Therefore, the Socratic philosopher does not directly need their
own speech. Rather, their task is to engage others and force them to
participate in dialectical discussions to determine if their theories can
lead to true wisdom. This is something that Socrates does directly with
Agathon. Therefore, if Agathon is the product of the Athenian educa-
tional system, Plato is emphasising to his audience that the system is
not fully developing its youth.
In looking at the text, the structure of Diotima’s speech seems to fol-
low a very set educative path. She starts by questioning Socrates in a
similar way to Agathon’s refutation. Then Diotima provides a mythi-
cal story for the creation of Eros that defines its role as the product of
resource and poverty. Even within this mythical story, Diotima is provid-
ing an explanatory argument for her definition of eros, something that
Agathon was not able to accomplish. In the next section of her speech,
Diotima fully fleshes out her understanding of eros, “The main point
is this: every desire for good things or for happiness is the ‘supreme
and treacherous love’ in everyone” (205d). Firstly, this definition is more
in line with Agathon’s thoughts of creative passion than with Aristo-
phanes’s unique love of another individual. But, she also provides a
more comprehensive definition than Agathon. Eros should be under-
stood as desire, something that is not tied exclusively to matters of lov-
ing other individuals, but also something not tied exclusively to the pro-
duction of good and beautiful things. Therefore, we should understand
eros as something that has to be directed in a particular way, if it is going
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to assist us in attaining all of the great things Agathon discusses in his
speech.
In the next section of her speech, the ascent passages, Diotima devel-
ops both a criticism of current forms of education and a positive alterna-
tive account that seems to build off of Agathon’s speech, refutation, and
overall role in the dialogue. Firstly, the critique entails that there is a cor-
rect way to use one’s erotic passions, and a wrong way. In one particular
example, Diotima actually uses the verb paiderastein to describe what it
means to love rightly, “When someone rises by these stages, through lov-
ing boys correctly, and begins to see this beauty, he has almost grasped
his goal” (211B). This passage suggests that paiderastein is a necessary
step to “loving rightly”, but only insofar as it is used to move up the
ladder towards beauty itself. While this example illustrates a critique
of pederastic relations, there also appears to be a more comprehensive
argument against Athenian education at large. In fact, it seems that
paiderastein is just an immediate starting point to the ascent. Once one
sees beauty within bodies, “The result is that our lover will be forced to
gaze at the beauty of activities and laws and to see that all this is akin
to itself, with the result that he will think that the beauty of bodies is
a thing of no importance” (210c). Therefore, it seems that all sorts of
earthly passions fall into stages on the ascent ladder. Thus, we can see
that the criticism is that the standard forms of education do not promote
the same type of upward movement as the philosophical life. Rather,
by simply pursuing one of these educational routes, (rhetoric, politics,
poetry, medicine, etc.) there is no incentive to move upward towards the
beautiful. Thus, we will need a system that promotes this journey. In the
case of Agathon, we see an example of someone who perhaps had the
potential to come to the highest mysteries that Diotima discusses, yet,
his education did not develop these capacities.
Still, Diotima’s speech also develops a positive account of the philo-
sophical life. To move up the ladder and eventually see beauty requires
living an examined life, “but the lover is turned to the great sea of beauty,
and, gazing upon this, he gives birth too many gloriously beautiful ideas
and theories [. . . ] until [. . . ] he catches sight of such knowledge” (210d-
e). In this passage, Diotima draws a distinction between ideas or the-
ories, and fully developed knowledge. Therefore, the ascent to beauty,
significantly reflects the examined or philosophical life. Through dialec-
tic, one can turn their ideas into actual knowledge. However, as we
have already seen, Agathon is not expected to be able to move up the
ladder and see the highest mysteries. Diotima even warns Socrates that
he might not move to that level (209e-210a). Nevertheless, it does seem
that Agathon embodies the right type of character to which this sort of
information would be useful. Even if Agathon is not expected to change
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his life after this encounter, the youth that he represents, those with high
moral intuitions and good intellectual passions, by reading this dialogue,
might learn how to utilise their potential.
￿ . ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ , ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ , ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ , ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ symposium
In the last section of the Symposium, we get to see Plato’s drama played
out. On one side, you have Socrates (the embodiment of philosophy),
on the other, you have Alcibiades (the embodiment of the political and
honor-filled life), and, in between, you have Agathon (the embodiment
of youth). In this reading, Alcibiades seems to also embody a method
for attaining wisdom, e.g. the pederastic model, which cannot be de-
tached from physical acts. Much like Agathon, he sees that Socrates
has valuable ‘information’ that he would like to possess through sexual
methods of transference. However, when Alcibiades is forced to “feel
shame” by Socrates’s refutations, and his weaknesses and shortcomings
are revealed, he responds by rejecting philosophy and “caving into (his)
desire to please the crowd” (216b). Therefore, we see that Alcibiades’s
speech serves as a temptation of pederasty and a warning against such
Socratic methods of acquiring wisdom. Simply, Alcibiades was once
intrigued by what Socrates seemed to possess, yet was, and still is, con-
sistently disappointed. In a way, he seems to represent the common
view of Socrates: intrigued, yet, frustrated.
Agathon seems quite content to deny Alcibiades and follow Socrates,
“but he won’t get away with it; I’m coming right over to lie down next
to you” (222E). What is the difference between Agathon and Alcibiades?
They are both young, beautiful, intelligent, and successful. Why does it
seem that Agathon is eager to accept Socrates’s methods? Further, as we
have seen, it would not seem plausible that Plato felt Agathon was still in
a position to turn towards the philosophical life. Therefore, why would
Plato develop this humorous competition over Agathon, especially if his
audience knew Agathon did not turn towards the philosophic life?
One of the most humorous sections of the Symposium comes in the
final dramatic scene between Socrates, Alcibiades and Agathon. On the
one hand, Alcibiades is clearly still in love with Socrates, yet, hates him
at the same time. Further, the three characters play a game of cat and
mouse as they switch seats on the couch. However, as Socrates claims
in this last section, “the skillful tragic dramatist should also be a comic
poet” (223d). Within this scene, we also find the ultimate tragedy of
the Symposium. Many people have argued that the Symposium’s tragic
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ’￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 23
element exists in the relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades.10 In
particular, we should keep its specific dramatic dates in mind, and view
the tragedy as connected to the mutilation of the herms, and profana-
tion of the mysteries that occurred in the following months. As well as,
of course, Socrates’s death in 399 BC (Nails, 2006: 200). As interpreters
have pointed out, many of the Symposium’s characters were involved in
these events that led to the Athenian downfall, namely Alcibiades, Phae-
drus and Eryximachus (Nails, 2006: 201). However, this sort of interpre-
tation fails to address the dialogue as a whole. Therefore, by building
the dialogue around the relationship between Agathon and Socrates, a
new interpretation of this tragedy becomes possible.
After hearing Socrates’s speech, demonstrating his own intellectual
capabilities and moral intuitions, and resisting the temptation of Alcib-
iades, Agathon is sitting doing philosophy with Socrates and yet still
falls asleep. After this point, it seems fair to assert that Agathon did
not drastically change his life. He did not end his relationship with Pau-
sanias, and he continued working as a playwright. Most importantly,
he did not pursue a philosophical lifestyle. Certainly, we are meant
to place this text in its appropriate historical context, and understand
that the majority of the other symposiasts went on to take part in the
destruction of their own society. However, in this subtle reading, even
the good-natured and morally inclined symposiast is too corrupted by
his society to lead the examined life. Following this dialogue, it should
no longer surprise us that we begin to see the development of a strict
philosophical educational program, specifically with the writing of the
Republic. Perhaps there is no hope for the self-indulgent Alcibiades, but
for all those like Agathon, “the good man”, there needs to be a better
educational system to guide them towards philosophy. The goal is not
necessarily to generate good people out of bad material, but to develop a
system that guarantees a full actualisation of one’s potentials. The prob-
lem with pederasty or rhetoric, even at their most noble forms, are their
failures in this regard, namely, truth and goodness are not their main
concerns. Therefore, even the good-natured Agathon will not be able to
circumvent societal values to achieve an understanding of the good.
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